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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of private actions to vindicate public rights is a perplexing
difficulty in the enforcement of laws relating to economic regulation.
Private antitrust enforcement presents a particularly dramatic example-
one that has captivated scholars for decades, and which remains a subject
of vociferous debate.' The challenge is an institutional one. At bottom,
private antitrust enforcement presents the danger of incentives misaligned
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1. The extent of the appropriate remedy for a private suit is one area of debate. See,
e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE (2005); RICHARD POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed.) (2002); Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40
U.S.F. L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (attacking the conventional wisdom that treble damages
remedies over-deter); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1450-52 (1985) (demonstrating that optimal deterrence analysis
supports treble damages liability in conjunction with procedural limitations on suit). That
debate assumes meritorious claims. Another difficulty is the danger of non-meritorious
strike suits. See, e.g., William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee
Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1891-
93, 1921 (2003). Cf Posner, supra, at 275 & n.8 (noting the "class action extortion"
problem). On the other hand, commentators have emphasized the importance of the private
suit in the overall enforcement scheme. See generally Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J.
White, Economic Analysis ofPrivate Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1001 & nn.1-3
(canvassing authorities).
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from the rationales for antitrust enforcement.
2  The solution is a
combination of substantive and procedural refinements to realign the
incentives.3
On the substantive side, courts and scholars have long recognized that
parallel conduct by horizontal competitors-those competing in the same
geographic and product markets and at the same level of the chain of
distribution-does not raise red flags about the possibility of illegal
concerted action.4 That understanding underlies decades of Supreme Court
precedent, dating back at least to the opinion of Justice Clark in Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp.,' and continuing
through cases such as Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,6 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,' and
most recently, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.8 According to the Court in
Matsushita, Sherman One requires a theory of the plaintiffs case that
"tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted
independently."9 The more recent decisions also recognize another reality
that has informed antitrust decision-making since at least the neo-classical
economic revolution in the field beginning in the 1960's. Litigation in
general, but especially onerous, complex litigation that characterizes most
private-plaintiff suits under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
1° can be a
massive expenditure of productive resources. It is dead-weight loss that
cannot be justified if the conduct complained of is most likely innocent.
1
Procedural issues regarding private plaintiffs' access to courts arise as
well. The well-understood substantive principles regarding antitrust
conspiracies are met with equally well-known dictum regarding the method
2. See Max Huffman, A Standing Framework for Private Extraterritorial Antitrust
Enforcement, 60 SMU L. REV. 103, 114 (2007) (discussing the self-interest that motivates
private plaintiffs).
3. Id. at 113 & n.70 (describing "optimizing" remedies that both deter and compensate
appropriately).
4. See C. Brien Dillon, Similarity of Prices with Those of Competitors, in
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 1958 INSTITUTE ON ANTITRUST LAWS 23, 30-32 (1958)
(canvassing Supreme Court case law and enforcement authorities' positions and concluding
conscious parallelism is not sufficient to establish a conspiracy).
5. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
6. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
7. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
8. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
9. 475 U.S. at 588.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
11. See Richard A. Epstein, Motions to Dismiss in Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact
from Fantasy, 3-4 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publ'n 06-
08, 2006). Of course, if private litigation offers sufficient benefits in the form of deterrence
or compensation, the twin goals of private antitrust enforcement the loss is justifiable. See
Huffman, supra note 2, at 107. There is reason to be skeptical on that front, however. See
infra Part III.A.
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of pleading cases in federal court. Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson12
placed a gloss on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,"3 holding that so long
as any statement of facts could be proved consistent with the allegations a
plaintiff made in its complaint, the complaint was sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. That rule-itself a staple of Supreme Court doctrine,
and reaffirmed recently in cases such as Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit 4 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A." 5-- could, if taken literally, have extraordinary and far-reaching
consequences. A plaintiff could plead that "the sky is blue," and
nonetheless be entitled to discovery, because it is possible to prove facts
consistent with the sky being blue that would provide a basis for relief. 6
There is obvious tension between concerns for false positives in
private Sherman One suits and traditional understandings of ease of access
to courts for private plaintiffs. That tension presents certain neat
coincidences. The modern conceptions of both schemes, tracing back to
Theatre Enterprises and Conley, are both creatures of the last half-
century." Both schemes provide mechanisms-one procedural, one
substantive-meant to compensate for injury and deter injurious conduct.
Both present dangers of abuse that can summon drastic social ills. But the
two schemes also dovetail neatly in a demonstration of Sir Henry Maine's
famous statement that "substantive law has at first the look of being
gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."'" Together, they
12. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (discussing the burden of proof on the movant in a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
14. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
15. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
16. Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1665,
1668 (1998) (noting that "literal compliance with Conley" could consist of nothing more
than the parties' names and a prayer for relief). Such a literal interpretation is, of course, a
reductio ad absurdum of the language the Court employed in Conley. See Conley, 355 U.S.
41, 45 (stating that a complaint should not be dismissed for failing to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts).
It also fails to heed the text of Rule 8 and writes out of the rule the power expressly granted
to federal trial courts to dismiss plaintiffs' suits for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On the other hand, Professor Thomas
argues carefully that the open-door approach to pleading followed by the more liberal
understanding of Conley is commanded by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. See Suja Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, MINN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (draft at 7, available at http://ssm.com/abstract - 1010062).
17. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 544
(1954) (holding that earlier decrees against defendant for violating antitrust laws had little
relevancy in present conspiracy action suit against defendant); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957) (validating plaintiffs' private cause of action against railroad union for
discriminatory practices).
18. SIR HENRY S. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (John
Murray, Albemarle Street 1883).
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prescribe the means by which potentially meritorious antitrust litigation can
proceed to discovery and trial. The two schemes also permit litigation that
is not based on any reasonable belief of wrongful conduct to be stopped
before excessive waste occurs.
The Supreme Court in 2007 again affirmed the Rule 8 pleading
standard and the principles underlying Theatre Enterprises and its progeny.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,' 9 the Court demonstrated that a middle
ground exists in which the liberal pleading standard can be reconciled with
the conservative substantive legal rule. Twombly has been called the
sleeper case of the 2006 Supreme Court term.20 The reaction to Twombly
was immediate and vociferous, with courts re-evaluating their approaches
to motions to dismiss2' and many scholars expressing their views that the
Court's interpretation of Rule 8 is an abandonment of the Conley rule.22
The interplay between Rule 8 and the requirements for proving a
conspiracy under Sherman One came before the federal courts in the
context of a private antitrust suit brought by end-user consumers that
alleged a conspiracy among providers of local telephone and internet
23services. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants conspired both to
prevent entry by other competitors into their respective service areas and
not to enter into each others' service areas in competition with one
another.24 The result, according to plaintiffs, was that the petitioners
maintained monopolies in their geographic markets, causing injury to
consumers."s The allegations made in Twombly, if proved, would represent
per se violations of Sherman One, and give rise to treble damages liability
in a civil suit and jail time and criminal fines in a criminal proceeding.26
19. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
20. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal
Courts-Again, FINDLAw, Aug. 13, 2007, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html
(describing the impact of Twombly in contrast to its relative prior obscurity).
21. See, e.g., In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., No. 06-3128-CV, slip op. 8-9 (2d Cir. Sept.
4, 2007) (citing Twombly in holding that plaintiffs did not meet pleading standard for
conspiracy claim). See also Dorf, supra note 20 (counting 457 cites to Twombly between
the May 2007 decision date and the August 13 publication date of the column).
22. See id. See also A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 28-35 (forthcoming
2008) (on file with author) (criticizing Twombly for being "dramatically inconsistent" with
the Federal Rules and Conley); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 121 (2007); Gregory P. Joseph, Supreme Court
Rewrites Pleading Requirements (2007), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Sup%20Ct%20Rewrites%20Pleading%2
ORules.pdf; Max Huffiman, Casenote: Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, eCCP (May 2007),
available at http://www. globalcompetitionpolicy.org/; Thomas, supra note 16.
23. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961.
24. Id. at 1962.
25. Id.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (felony to conspire to restrain
commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (treble damages for private plaintiffs).
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The local telephone industry at issue in Twombly has been marked by
a complex history of regulated monopoly and, since 1996, torturous
attempts at deregulation. 2' The petitioners' respective "service markets"
are the result of historical accident. Before February 8, 1996, when
President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,28 the
monopolies in those markets were protected by state law. 29 The patchwork
of monopoly in local service areas traces itself to another massive antitrust
suit, that one brought by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. The
parties settled that suit in 1982 with a consent decree, and two years later,
under Judge Green's Modified Final Judgment,30 AT&T divested all its
local telephony assets by spinning off the seven Baby Bells. A series of
mergers among the Baby Bells produced four remaining competitors:
BellSouth Corporation, SBC Communications, Inc., Qwest
Communications International, Inc. and Verizon Communications, Inc., the
defendants in Twombly.3 1
Deregulation in local telephony had the effect of creating two business
models for firms seeking to provide local telecom services. One model is
that of the traditional local telephone provider-the incumbent Baby
Bells-which are commonly referred to as Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers (ILECs). Prior to deregulation, those providers maintained
exclusive franchises in particular regions under state law. ILECs own and
27. According to economist Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution, "no industry
has been as ill-prepared to move from regulated monopoly to competition as the local
telephone industry." Robert W. Crandall, Are We Deregulating Telephone Services? Think
Again, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, March 1997, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1997/03telecommunications-crandall.aspx. See also Phil
Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 819,
837-41 (2000) (discussing the need for evolving regulatory approaches in the telecom
industry).
28. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
29. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (noting states,
"typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local service area" until the 1990s). The
Court in Twombly colorfully noted that "[t]he ILECs were bom in this world" and they
"doubtless liked the world the way it was." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972.
30. United States v. American Telephone, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (divestiture
ordered to be effective Jan. 1, 1984) (approving consent decree that mandated, inter alia,
equal access to interconnection facilities).
31. See Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). At the
time suit was filed in Twombly, Bell Atlantic Corp. had not yet merged with Verizon Corp.
Under another merger that was consummated in December 2006, Bell South Corp. and SBC
Communications Inc. have now joined forces as AT&T. See In re AT&T Inc. and
BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control , No. 06-74, Mem. Op. and Order 2-3
(filed Mar. 26, 2007), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-06-189A 1 .pdf (approving the
proposed AT&T and BellSouth merger).
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provide service using their local networks. 32 The other business model is a
class of competitors known as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers
(CLECs) that seek to serve customers in competition with the ILECs now
that the local markets have been opened to competition. CLECs usually
compete by leasing network space from ILECs at rates prescribed by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 3' The Twombly plaintiffs alleged that
but for a conspiracy on the part of the ILEC defendants, CLECs would
have entered into competition on a larger scale, and ILECs would have
entered as CLECs into each others' territories. The resulting competition,
according to plaintiffs, would have produced lower prices for consumers.3 4
Alleging a class of all users of local telephone and internet service from the
passage of the Telecommunications Act until the time of filing suit,
plaintiffs sought treble damages relief for the alleged harm.35
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. In doing so, the court
viewed the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard through the lens of the
substantive Sherman One cause of action.36 Because "the Supreme Court
has never held that proof of parallel business behavior . . . itself constitutes
a Sherman Act offense," the court noted its responsibility to "distinguish
between conduct that represents the natural convergence of competitors'
market behavior, and conduct that appears to have been taken pursuant to
an agreement.,, 37 The court then turned to the "plus factor" framework that
courts of appeals widely regard as defining the distinction between
innocent parallel conduct and circumstantial evidence of conspiracy. It
held the plus factors were shorthand for plaintiffs' responsibility to "assert
facts that, if true, support the existence of a conspiracy."3 8
The district court held the specific allegations of the complaint were
insufficient to amount to allegations of a conspiracy. 39 While the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants' territorial markets appeared gerrymandered, the
court observed that was the result of historical accident. Parallel refusal to
be hospitable to entry by CLECs would be in each ILEC's unilateral best
interest. Parallel conduct in not entering into competition with one another
32. See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 371.
33. Id. at 371-72 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (1994)).
34. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 177-78 (alleging that the conspiracy forced the
plaintiffs "to pay the supracompetitive rates of ILECs rather than the presumably lower rates
that competition would have fostered").
35. Id. at 176.
36. Id. at 179-82.
37. Id. at 179 (quoting Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 544 (1954)).
38. Id. at 180-82. On plus factors generally, see 2 JOSEPH P. BAUER & WILLIAM H.
PAGE, KINTNER'S FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 11.5 (Anderson Publishing Co. 2d ed. 2002).
Cf. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
(holding parallel conduct is insufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy).
39. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
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was explainable by the fundamentally different nature of the CLEC
business model ("essentially middlemen, buying network time from ILECs
. . . and selling it for a profit") from the ILEC business model.40  One
specific allegation was of a quote by one defendant's CEO. The court held
that the quote must be taken in the context in which it was made. Viewed
in context, the quote spoke only to the defendant company's unilateral best
interest.4' Finally, the court rejected an allegation that the defendants had
conspired because it was conclusory. A unanimous panel of the Second
Circuit reversed, holding that the Conley standard commanded the
conclusion that factual allegations that were ambiguous as to whether
conduct was legitimate or illegal were sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.
42
The Second Circuit applied more formalistically the rule that "a court
would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism was the product of
collusion rather than coincidence. ' 43 That standard was easily met by the
plaintiffs' complaint in Twombly. It was possible, for example, that
observed parallel conduct in failing to enter other ILECs' service areas as
CLECs was the result of a market division agreement. It was possible that
observed parallel inhospitality to entry by CLECs reflected a conspiracy to
maintain the oligopoly to which the ILECs had grown accustomed.
So long as a conspiracy is "among the realm of plausible possibilities"
from the complaint's allegations-which clearly it was, and would be
except in the truly marginal circumstance-a court should deny a motion to
dismiss. 44 The court of appeals acknowledged the Supreme Court's rule
that to survive summary judgment, a Sherman One plaintiff must provide
evidence "'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged
conspirators acted independently. ' 45 But it concluded that the Matsushita
rule applied only at the summary judgment stage of proceedings.
The tension between the district court and the Second Circuit in
Twombly is at bottom a tension between a pragmatic and a formalistic
40. Id.
41. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 182-88. Richard Notebaert, the CEO of Quest, is
quoted as stating that "competing as a CLEC 'might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but
that doesn't make it right."' Id. at 184.
42. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
argument "that antitrust complaints merit a more rigorous pleading standard, whether
because of their typical complexity and sometimes amorphous nature, or because of the
related extraordinary burdens that litigation beyond the pleading stage may place on
defendants and the courts.").
43. Id. at 114.
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 113-14 (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 588 (1986), which cites Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
764).
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approach to pleading. The district court stated that its holding "is
somewhat in tension with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which
requires only a 'short and plain statement of the claim,' and allows
plaintiffs to base their complaints on statements of ultimate facts. ''46 For its
part, the Second Circuit recognized:
that a balance is being struck here, that on one side of that
balance is the sometimes colossal expense of undergoing
discovery, that such costs themselves likely lead defendants to
pay plaintiffs to settle what would ultimately be shown to be
meritless claims, that the success of such meritless claims
encourages others to be brought, and that the overall result may
well be a burden on the courts and a deleterious effect on the
manner in which and efficiency with which business is
conducted.47
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding in an opinion
by Justice Souter that the complaint did not contain enough facts to cross
the line from a mere possibility of illegal conspiratorial activity into the
arena of "plausibility. '48 Rather than making any effort to reconcile the
tension between Rule 8 and the leading case interpreting the rule, Conley,
and what it concluded was the need to protect defendants against frivolous
antitrust litigation, the Court simply wrote the heart of Conley out of the
books. Perhaps the most remarkable for having been penned by Justice
Souter, one of the Court's more liberal members, the Court held that the
famous "no state of facts" standard from Conley "after puzzling the
profession for 50 years ... has earned its retirement. ,
4
1
This Article undertakes a positivist justification of the rule announced
in Twombly. Part II concentrates on the procedural questions that arise at
the motion to dismiss stage of litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
codifies a standard of pleading under which complaints must both provide
proper notice to the defendants-a universally accepted basis for the
pleading requirement-and show pleaders' entitlement to relief-a much
more controversial proposition.50 The "notice" requirement is not terribly
vigorous. The "demonstration" requirement is what keeps Rule 8 from
being an open door. It also comports with the plain language of Rule 8 and
the motion to dismiss construct of Rule 12(b)(6).51 Rule 8(e) (formerly
46. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (internal quotations omitted).
47. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 117.
48. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965-66 (2007).
49. Id. at 1969.
50. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV.
987 (2003) (arguing that the pleading rules exist to provide notice only).
51. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6).
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8(f)) is also relevant. It prescribes, simply, that district courts must use
their discretion to do "justice."52
Part III examines the implications for the private Sherman One claim
of the new understanding of Rule 8. Viewing the pleading requirement
through the lens of the governing substantive law, in order to plead
Sherman One properly a plaintiffs factual allegations must create an
inference of a conspiracy. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
plead plus factors, which are facts "tending to exclude the possibility"53 that
each defendant acted in its unilateral best interest. Couching plaintiffs'
pleading responsibility in this manner makes clear that the Twombly rule
does not apply uniquely to Sherman One litigation. It is trans-substantive.
It is the substantively complex nature of the Sherman One claim that gives
rise to any particular difficulties for private litigants.54 Part II continues to
consider anecdotes of pleading practice in the Sherman One context in the
lower courts since Twombly.
II. THE FEDERAL PLEADING AND DISMISSAL SCHEME
Rule 8 controls the sufficiency of plaintiffs' statement of claims.55
Together with Rule 12(b)(6), it provides a mechanism for courts to dismiss
claims.56  The rules require courts to construe pleadings "so as to do
justice."57  The standards exist to accomplish two primary ends. They
mitigate the concern that a defendant-much like Kafka's character Josef
K.-might be subjected to defending against suit without knowing what it
did that gave rise to the claims. 8 More controversially, Rules 8 and
12(b)(6) give district courts means to dismiss suits that are not justifiable in
light of the governing substantive legal scheme.5 9
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (as amended 2007).
53. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964.
54. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading (Washington & Lee Legal Studies
Paper No. 2007-17, 26-27, 2007) available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstractid=1003874
(arguing that the substantive requirements for a Sherman One claim make pleading Sherman
One more difficult than other civil claims); see also Dodson, supra note 22, at 124 (noting
that "several courts have already interpreted [Twombly] beyond antitrust").
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (listing the requirements for a pleading stating a claim for
relief).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing dismissal for a "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted").
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
58. Cf FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998)
(1925).
59. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986) (arguing the purpose of pleading should be to
better enable courts to decide cases on the merits); see also Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):
Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 607 (2007)
2008]
636 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
A. The Relevant Federal Rules
The Federal Rules are to be interpreted like federal statutes, according
to plain language principles of interpretation. The Supreme Court
unanimously held in Leatherman that Rule 8 "meant what it said.",
60 The
rules, then, are not subject to amendment by judicial interpretation.
61 The
plain language of Rule 8 and Rule 12 provide substantial ammunition
supporting the Court's decision in Twombly strictly to curtail the Conley
rule.
The preeminent treatise on federal procedure notes that the broadest
interpretation of the Conley dictum (the "sky is blue" allegations) cannot be
the rule.62 Professor Miller notes that "a bare averment that the pleader
wants compensation and is entitled to it" is insufficient.
63  That
understanding of Rule 8 respects the requirement contained in the rule that
a plaintiff make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the
pleader is entitled to relief."6" Despite Conley, the Supreme Court held in
2005-its most recent prior analysis of the Rule 8 standard-that a plaintiff
must allege facts making out each element of its claim.
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,65 the Court considered the
standards for pleading a private plaintiff claim for a violation of the federal
securities laws. The substantive claim at issue in Dura was a violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5.
The claim required proof of six elements, one of which is "loss
causation. 66 Loss causation is the existence of a proximate causal link
(discussing three rules governing pleading under Rule 8 including notice, ensuring the
viability of the claim, and the requirement that the claim be premised on a "factual
transaction and not simply on an abstract invocation of the law"). Of course, the rules are
not written on a blank slate. The Federal Rules operate against a constitutional backdrop. It
is possible the Constitution has more stringent standards than does the text of Rules 8 and 12
for permitting plaintiffs to have access to federal court. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 6-7
(arguing "the Supreme Court was wrong to state that Congress and the rule-makers could
impose essentially limitless requirements upon plaintiffs at the pleading stage").
60. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
61. See id.; see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120,
123 (1989) ("We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and
generally with them as with a statute, when we find the terms unambiguous, judicial inquiry
is complete .... (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
62. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
1216, 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (interpreting Rule 8(a)).
63. Id.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that facts alleged must "outline or adumbrate" a claim).
65. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
66. Id. at 341 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5).
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between a material misrepresentation and the plaintiffs loss. 67 Although
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act governs claims under Rule
1Ob-5 and imposes a heightened pleading standard on those claims, 68 the
Court "assume[d], at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules nor
the securities statutes impose any special further requirement in respect to
the pleading of proximate causation or economic lOSS., ' 69 In Dura, Rule 8
and Conley governed the pleading issue. The Court held that the notice
requirement from Conley was not satisfied because the complaint did not
contain allegations going to an essential element-one that the plaintiff
would be required to prove at trial--of the plaintiffs claim.7°
It is interesting that, after the Court's unanimous statements in
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz that Rule 8 is subject to plain-language
interpretation, the Dura Court relied for its holding on a judicial gloss from
Conley.7 In Dura, Rule 8's textual requirement that the plaintiff "show[]
entitle[ment] to relief' would have been a sufficient basis for the holding.
By contrast, Dura is harder to justify based on a lack of notice. The
"notice" goals Conley grafted onto Rule 8 were met in Dura.72
The Second Circuit in Twombly gave Dura only passing mention. It
preferred the Court's 2002 decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 73 which
held that a plaintiff need not plead around a burden-shifting framework for
a Title VII claim. The Title VII complaint at issue in Swierkiewicz was
sufficient even if the plaintiff did not plead a lack of non-discriminatory
reasons for its disparate treatment.74
In one sense, the Title VII claim in Swierkiewicz makes a facially
attractive analogy to the Sherman One suit. In a suit under Title VII, a
plaintiff can claim he or she was treated differently than was another
employee, who is not a member of a protected class. The employer then
has the burden to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the disparate treatment. Only if the employer does so must the plaintiff
67. Id. at 341.
68. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2007)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)).
69. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
70. Id. at 346.
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (plaintiff must make a "showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief'). Commentators, too, have preferred Conley's gloss to the text of Rule 8.
See Fairman, supra note 50, at 988 (citing Rule 8(a) for the proposition that a complaint
need only put the defendant on notice).
72. It is unclear how the failure to plead "loss causation" creates a notice problem for a
lob-5 defendant. That element has nothing to do with the conduct of the defendant and
everything to do with the circumstances of the plaintiff. Cf Ides, supra note 59, at 612
(notice has nothing to do with the requirement of substantive sufficiency of a complaint).
73. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
74. Id. at 511-12 (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
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bring evidence to demonstrate that justification is pretextual.
75 The
conspiracy claim under Sherman One is analogous. A plaintiff must prove
sufficient facts giving rise to an inference of conspiracy, and the defendants
can rebut those facts with a non-conspiratorial justification for the conduct
alleged. If the defendants do so, presumably-like the Title VII plaintiff-
the Sherman One plaintiff would argue the justification is pretextual.
Viewed more pragmatically, the Sherman One conspiracy claim is
dramatically different from Swierkiewicz.
7 6  The Title VII-type burden
shifting analysis has no place in the context of Sherman One. The
plaintiff's affirmative case includes the requirement that the plaintiff plead
and prove that the conduct alleged was the product of a conspiracy. That
requirement exists whether or not the defendant provides an alternate
explanation. The distinction is made clearer by noting Justice Thomas's
admonition in Swierkiewicz that "the McDonnell Douglas framework does
not apply in every employment discrimination case."
77 That is much in
contrast to the Sherman One standard. The requirement that a plaintiff
plead and prove that conduct was the result of a conspiracy is immutable.
The reason Swierkiewicz does little to inform the Sherman One
standard is perhaps best understood as a policy distinction underlying the
respective substantive legal rules of Title VII and Sherman One. As in
Conley, itself an employment-rights case, McDonnell Douglas and
Swierkiewicz reflect a policy decision favoring workers in protected classes
by presuming discrimination from a showing of disparate treatment. The
antitrust rules do not presume a conspiracy from allegations of parallel
conduct. They presume legitimate business justifications exist for firms'
conduct.7"
It is easy to be misled by the language the Supreme Court used in
Conley to gloss the Rule 8 standard. Under the "sky is blue" pleading
theory, so long as a plaintiff s complaint did not affirmatively demonstrate
the lack of entitlement to relief, the motion to dismiss would be denied.
Another dean of federal civil procedure, Professor Hazard, stated that view
75. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
76. But see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1982 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Dodson, supra note 22, at 127-28; Spencer, supra note 54, at 42-43.
77. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
78. Cf Epstein, supra note 11, at 3-4 (noting the danger of drawing negative inferences
from neutral conduct); Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964. Commentators who consider Twombly
in tension with Swierkiewicz do not address this distinction. See Dodson, supra note 22, at
127-28. This distinction prevents reconciling the apparent tension between Twombly and
the Sherman One claim on the one hand, and Swierkiewicz and the Title VII claim on the
other, by either reinterpreting Sherman One to involve burden shifting or reinterpreting Title
VII to include the lack of a non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision as an
element of the plaintiff's affirmative case. The first would improperly increase the risk of
false positives (see infra Part III) while the second would undermine the Title VII claim.
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this way: "Literal compliance with Conley v. Gibson could consist simply
of giving the names of the plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for
judgment."79
Surely Conley did not announce such a non-standard. If it did, it was
dictum, as the complaint in Conley easily satisfies even the more stringent
standard the Court recognized in Dura and Twombly.8° More importantly
for the purposes of this Article, Dura and Twombly clearly require the
pleading of elements of a claim. The elements are the "showing" that the
plaintiff is "entitled to relief."'"
Looking beyond the plain text of Rule 8 (and beyond the glosses
imposed by courts following Conley), commentary by Judge Charles Clark,
the "architect" of the federal rules, and his contemporaries supports
interpreting Rule 8 to require plaintiffs to plead elements. The thrust of
Rule 8, to Judge Clark, was the avoidance of detail in pleadings-not the
elimination of a requirement that the plaintiff "state a claim."82 According
to New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, analyzing the
Federal Civil Rules,
the objective of reaching an issue of law or of fact in two or at the
most three simple pleadings has been attained but not at the
sacrifice of stating the elements of a claim or defense .... The
grand objective of the movement for simplified procedure by
rules of court is the elimination of the interminable prolixity and
absurd technicalities of special pleading-not by abandoning
stating the essentials of a cause of action or of a defense, but by
doing so in 'simple, concise and direct' terms.83
Others noted the importance of following the text of Rules 8 and 12.
"A claim for which relief can be granted is a claim which is cognizable in
law., 8 4 Another commentator decried interpretations of Rule 8(a)(2) that
79. Geoffrey C. Hazard, supra note 16, at 1685.
80. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42-43 (1957) (paraphrasing the complaint).
Any realistic appreciation of Conley must acknowledge Justice Black's frustration with
shenanigans by unions in avoiding their Railway Labor Act obligations to represent black
members fairly. The opinion begins, "Once again [black] employees are here under the
Railway Labor Act asking that their collective bargaining agent be compelled to represent
them fairly. In a series of cases . . . this Court has repeatedly ruled that an exclusive
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated to represent all employees in the
bargaining unit fairly and without discrimination on the basis of race .... Id. at 42.
81. Rule 12(b)(6) provides further support for the plain-language interpretation of Rule
8(a). If the broadest understanding of the Conley gloss were law, it would write out of the
federal rules the power to dismiss cases which Rule 12(b)(6) expressly grants.
82. Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case ", 21 F.R.D. 45, 52 (1957).
83. Statement of Judge Hall, in Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 264-65
(1952) (quoting a letter from Judge Vanderbilt).
84. Statement of Judge Mathes, in Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 265
(1952).
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emphasized liberal pleading at the expense of the plain language of the
rule. "Those words 'showing that the pleader is entitled to relief seem to
have been read out of the Rule ....85
B. Application to "The Big Case"
86
Even advocates of liberal pleading practice emphasize the necessity
that a complaint put the defendant on notice of the claims against it.
Indeed, "notice" is the preferred justification for the pleading standard.
Professor Fairman favors a less stringent pleading standard, but nonetheless
recognizes that the notice requirement is what precludes a plaintiff's resort
to alleging legal conclusions, rather than facts supporting the claims.
"Legal conclusions do not comport with a notice standard."
87 Professor
Ides advances another justification for the prohibition of pleading legal
conclusions. He argues that "the complaint must place the claims asserted
within the context of a factual narrative.""s Ides derives his view from
some combination of Rule 8's requirement of a "showing" of entitlement to
relief and the Article III "case or controversy" requirement for a claim in
federal court.8 9
If one looks only to "Form 9," the model form in the Federal Rules for
a complaint alleging negligence, 90 it might appear that conclusory
allegations are always permitted. 9' Form 9 establishes as a matter of law
that a complaint alleging the defendant "negligently drove" is sufficient.
Alleging "negligence" is certainly alleging a legal conclusion.
92 Form 9 is
not terribly informative as to the problem of pleading "the big case" such as
a Sherman One conspiracy. "Negligently drove" describes a narrow,
generally agreed-upon set of circumstances. The allegation provides notice
to the party who is alleged to have negligently driven what generally, if not
85. Statement of Moses Laskey, in Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 268-69
(1952).
86. Judge Clark's term. Clark, supra note 82, at 45. Judge Clark believed the rules
applied equally in the context of massive complex litigation, including antitrust claims. Id.
at 52. See also Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex
Litigation: A Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Cases,
14 REV. LITIG. 113, 113 (1994). But see Epstein, supra note 11, at 1-3 (noting that the
Federal Rules were never meant to deal with complex cases).
87. Fairman, supra note 50, at 999.
88. Ides, supra note 59, at 608.
89. Id. at 607.
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 84, Form 9. Form 9 is as a matter of law a sufficient complaint
in negligence. It is notable for its brevity.
91. Id. See Dodson, supra note 22, at 127 (arguing Form 9 demonstrates conclusory
allegations are necessarily sufficient); Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 54, at 38
(citing other examples of legal conclusions in the form complaints).
92. See id.
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what exactly, he or she is supposed to have done wrong.93 "Conspiracy," as
is demonstrated in some depth within, at least under the antitrust laws, is a
slippery concept.94
Judge Clark would have agreed that some line exists beyond which
allegations are too conclusory to be sufficient. He considered it "settled"
that "the pleader shows the facts and the court applies the legal
conclusion."95
The notice requirement distinguished Twombly from Swierkiewicz and
Conley. In both of those cases, the defendants knew exactly what they
supposedly had done wrong. The complaints alleged plaintiffs had been
treated differently based on national origin and race, respectively. An
additional allegation that there was no race or national-origin neutral
justification for the defendant's conduct would not improve the defendants'
understanding of what they did to aggrieve the plaintiffs.
The Sherman One claim is different. Allegations that a defendant
"conspired" does not tell the defendant what conduct, from the limitless
possible things corporations (acting through their agents) do, constituted
the conspiracy. That is especially so in view of the imperfect and much-
debated definition of a Sherman One conspiracy.96 Answering a complaint
and preparing a defense would require an internal investigation that would
mirror the discovery process in litigation. 97  Even that would not
necessarily inform the defendant what conduct the plaintiff would seize on
to support its claim. If notice concerns could justify the result in Dura,
where the unpleaded element was a causal connection between the fraud
and harm to the plaintiff-a subsidiary element in the 1 Ob-5 claim-they
are all the more pressing where the unpleaded element is the crux of what
the plaintiff is supposed to have done wrong.
The notice concerns take on special significance in the context of
massive commercial tort cases. The onerous nature of discovery gives
plaintiffs "an in terrorem increment of the settlement value." 98 Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores and Dura are securities fraud cases, but
93. See Ides, supra note 59, at 611-12 (range of conduct giving rise to "negligence" is
sufficiently small). But see Spencer, supra note 54, at 38 (arguing "reckless" in Form 10 is
indefinite).
94. See Ides, supra note 59, at 610 (although what constitutes "notice" does not vary
with different kinds of claims, what kind of pleading is required to give that notice is
variable; Form 9 does not inform the manner of pleading more complex claims); see also
infra Part II1. It is not outstanding to note that the distinction between conclusory "factual"
allegations, which the forms approve, and conclusory legal allegations, which Twombly
reiterates are insufficient, is an arbitrary one. Gray areas will exist. However, "conspiracy"
and "agreement" under the antitrust laws is not within the gray areas.
95. Clark, supra note 82, at 52.
96. See infra Part Ill.
97. Cf Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1970 n.10 (2007).
98. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
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twice the Supreme Court has expressed the same concern for settlement
leverage in the context of private antitrust litigation. In Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
99
the Court noted that a district court retains discretion "to insist upon some
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual
controversy to proceed."' 00  The same is true in Twombly. Courts and
commentators note "the costs of modem federal antitrust litigation"'
0 ' and
the concerns, which private antitrust litigation presents in spades, of
"asymmetric discovery costs.' ' 10 2
One response is that district courts can use their powers over the
discovery process to rein in those costs and abuses. The Twombly Court
believed that response is too facile. 0 3 Judge Easterbrook has argued that
for a host of reasons, control of discovery by district judges is a marginally
effective protection against abuses. If discovery is used to find the details
of the claim because the complaint is sketchy, limiting areas of inquiry
based on the contours of the cause of action is impossible. It is also not
effective to confine areas of inquiry based on the likelihood of it producing
fruit; judges have no way to know what the files of the recipient of
discovery contain. Only truly ridiculous requests will be possible to
contain." Another problem with relying on district judges to use their
inherent powers to rein in discovery costs is "the increasing caseload of the
federal courts."'0 5 Even if judges were equipped to do it, close monitoring
of years of pre-trial activities would bring the system to 
a halt. 0 6
A more robust response is that the very circumstances giving rise to
asymmetric discovery costs inure to defendants' benefit as well.
Asymmetric discovery costs will exist in circumstances where information
99. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
100. Id. at 528 n.17.
101. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984).
102. Asymmetric costs incentivize abusive discovery requests by one party, because the
other party has no way to retaliate with its own onerous requests. See Frank Easterbrook,
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 637, 643 (1989); William H. Wagener, Note,
Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust
Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1887, 1902-03 (2003).
103. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 n.6 (2007).
104. Easterbrook, supra note 102, at 638-39. The Twombly Court agreed.
"[D]etermining whether some illegal agreement may have taken place between unspecified
persons at different ILECs (each a multibillion dollar corporation with legions of
management level employees) at some point over seven years is a sprawling, costly, and
hugely time-consuming undertaking not easily susceptible to the kind of line drawing and
case management that the dissent envisions." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 n.6.
105. Car Carriers, 745 F.2d at 1106.
106. But see Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (on file with author) (arguing the concern for expensive pretrial
litigation is overblown).
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asymmetries are present as well.'17 If it is more expensive to defend a
private antitrust suit than it is to prosecute one, it is commensurately more
difficult for a private antitrust plaintiff to learn what happened in order to
draft its complaint, or to structure a document request or a deposition
notice. This information asymmetry favoring defendants encourages a
liberal pleading standard.
Three reasons-two primarily theoretical, one doctrinal-show
otherwise. Noted commentators including Judge Bork and Professor
Epstein have shown that error in antitrust litigation should be on the side of
false negatives rather than false positives, because the market is able to
correct for a failure to regulate but not for the loss caused by over-
regulation.0 8 That concern is greater in the context of private litigation than
in the context of government enforcement because of the concerns for
misaligned incentives. Also, Sherman One claims, more so than claims
under other legal schemes that are better understood (like the auto accident
in Form 9), raise the concern that plaintiffs are not able to exercise
judgment about the likelihood that observed actions result from illegal
conduct.'0 9 They are therefore more likely to sue over innocent conduct,
exacerbating the false positive concern. Finally, the doctrine supports
stringent review of pleadings in large civil litigation to better align
settlements and liability with actual bad conduct." 0
Twombly, involving a purported class of all users of local telephone
and Internet services against all of the Baby Bells, may have boasted a
nuisance settlement value exceeding $10 million. Given the potentially
crippling liability the defendants faced, plaintiffs would have massive
leverage in negotiations. The concern that underlies Blue Chip Stamps and
107. Thanks especially to Scott Dodson for demonstrating this point to me.
108. Epstein, supra note 11, at 4; ROBERT BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 117 (rev. ed.
1993).
109. Empirical evidence supports the proposition that lay jurors are more likely to
believe conduct is the result of an antitrust conspiracy than is consistent with a robust
understanding of business conduct. See Barbara S. Swain, Presentation at the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law, 55th Annual Spring Meeting: We All Had the Same Idea: How a Jury
Considers Claims Under the Monsanto Standard (Apr. 18, 2007) (paper and slides on file
with author). Analysis should be done of the relevance of that research to understanding
decision-making by plaintiffs and the impact of that evidence on pleading private antitrust
claims.
110. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983). Built into the doctrinal view is the understanding that a
plaintiff that does not know of illegal conduct has no right to conduct a fishing expedition in
an attempt to find it. See DM Research, Inc. v. College of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53,
56 (1st Cir. 1999). Cf Brian Fitzsimmons, Note, The Injustice of Notice & Heightened
Pleading Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims: It is Time to Balance the Scale for
Plaintiffs, Defendants and Society, 39 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (draft at 2, on file
with author) (arguing that a balance should be struck between denying plaintiffs access to
needed facts and preventing the harm to defendants from discovery in meritless cases).
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Associated General Contractors is that settlements are made with no regard
to defendants' actual liability. That danger was presented in Twombly."'
"The Big Case," a term coined by Judge Clark requires a "critical
assessment of the costs and benefits of stopping litigation at the pleading
stage relative to those of going forward with discovery."'1 2 That was what
the Supreme Court meant in Associated General Contractors, when it
recommended that district courts "insist upon some specificity in pleading"
in large private antitrust cases.' 13
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e), "[a]ll pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." That injunction is an odd
one. District courts are required (they do not have discretion) to use their
discretion. The Rule 8(e) injunction is also result oriented, not process
oriented. It insists that substantial justice be accomplished and does not
limit a court's choices as to how to achieve 
it.114
Former Rule 8(f) tends to be applied to resuscitate a complaint to
protect a plaintiffs cause of action.' In Swierkiewicz, the Court quoted
Rule 8(f) in passing while emphasizing the simplicity of the Rule 8(a)
notice pleading standard. In Conley, the Court used Rule 8(f) for the same
purpose. 1 6 Neither Court discussed the rule in greater detail or found it
necessary to invoke it to hold the complaints met the notice standard.
Certainly, there is nothing about former Rule 8(f) that prevents its
application as recommended here. Judge Keeton did so in Cash Energy v.
111. "The same rules of discovery that generate one or two days worth of litigation in
simple contract disputes" can take "years if not decades" in the case of massive class action
litigation against national companies like the Twombly defendants. Epstein, supra note 11,
at 6. Cf Paul J. Stancil, Atomism and the Private Merger Challenge, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 949,
996-99 (2005) (describing the "staggering" expense of defending against private antitrust
suits in the merger context). Indeed, the Supreme Court was convinced.
That potential expense is obvious enough in the present case: plaintiffs
represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local
telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States, in an
action against America's largest telecommunications firms (with many
thousands of employees generating reams and gigabytes of business records) for
unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over
a period of seven years.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007); Epstein, supra note 11, at 6.
112. Epstein, supra note 11, at 12.
113. Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 528 n.17.
114. Courts and defendants can also hang their hats on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1, which requires that the rules "be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
115. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
116. Of course, Conley can only be understood by reference to the particular
circumstances of that litigation. See supra note 80.
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Weiner,"' a case involving common-law fraud claims in the context of a
supposed violation of the Superfund statute. According to Judge Keeton,
"'substantial justice,' may be read as requiring judges to exercise some
degree of discretion rather than invariably applying the general rule of
notice pleading.""' 8 The Twombly Court's rejection of the Conley gloss in
the context of the massive litigation at issue is reminiscent of Judge
Keeton's wisdom in applying Rule 8(f), although the Supreme Court failed
to invoke the rule."19
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF SHERMAN ONE
Twombly does not state a new way to understand pleading
procedure. 2 ° It is an application of the plain language of Rule 8 to the
complex substantive law of antitrust conspiracies. At a minimum, that
means that the Twombly rule is trans-substantive. The prolixity of a
complaint will depend on the complexity of the substantive rule of law
being applied.'2
A. Parallel Conduct is Not Enough
The Sherman One claim requires a showing of a conspiracy. That
element has never been satisfied with a mere showing of competitors'
parallel conduct.'22
The rationale for requiring more than a showing of parallel conduct by
competitors to state a Sherman One claim is simple. No matter what the
level of competitiveness in an industry, economists know that firms acting
rationally can be expected to behave in a parallel manner. Amici
117. 768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991).
118. Id. at 897. The approach is taken without citing authority other than the former
Rule 8(f), and has not been followed by any court.
119. Commentators, too, have done surprisingly little to clarify Rule 8(e) (formerly 8(f)).
Like the majority of courts invoking its language, commentators favoring simplified
pleading standards cite the former Rule 8(f) in support. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 55, at
993. None have invoked it in support of Judge Keeton's interpretation in Cash Energy.
120. But see, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-16549, Slip Op. 2191 n.5 (9th
Cir. Mar. 7, 2008).
121. Cf Ides, supra note 59, at 610.
122. Arguing against the Twombly result, Professor Thomas contends that "evidence that
the ILECs engaged in the same behavior against the CLECs, and also the same behavior of
not competing with one another could demonstrate to a jury that the ILECs agreed to engage
in this behavior .... [T]his parallel behavior could show agreement." Thomas, supra, note
16 (draft at 32). That is incorrect. Parallel conduct is not inconsistent with a conspiracy, but
it is not indicative of-it in no circumstances "demonstrates"-a conspiracy. To permit a
jury to infer an agreement from parallel behavior is indistinguishable from permitting the
same jury to infer agreement from the fact that the sky is blue, which it seems clear no court
has ever done. See supra notes 16, 79.
2008]
646 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
economists in Twombly argued that in a "perfectly competitive market, all
firms charge the same price at all times."' 2 3  That is because in a
competitive market, all firms are price takers. They all respond in the same
manner to the same impulses, and none has the ability to raise prices above
its costs. 1
24
The same result occurs if the firms do have power over price as
oligopolists in a concentrated industry-much more akin to the real
circumstances in Twombly.'25 Parallel conduct occurs perhaps for the same
reason as in a competitive market, for example when regulatory
developments or technological innovations affect all firms in the industry
in the same manner. 126 Parallel conduct also potentially occurs for a
different, but also innocent, reason. Firms, like gas-station competitors on
opposite street comers, may look two moves ahead and appreciate the
effect their actions will have on their competitor, and vice versa. Those
oligopolists know, and they know their competitors know, and they know
their competitors know they know,'2 7 that if they act as industry mavericks
they will be less profitable than if they tacitly agree not to cut, or to
increase, prices. 128 That kind of coordination-although a contracts scholar
might well call it an implied agreement-is not illegal.
129
There are two primary justifications for permitting such tacit
collusion. One, advanced by Professor Turner in his 1962 paper on the
subject, holds that an oligopolist acting in its unilateral best interest is the
same thing as tacit collusion, so to outlaw the latter would be to require
123. Cert.-Stage Brief of William Baumol et al. in Support of Petitioners at 8-9, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, No. 05-1126 (U.S. 2007).
124. Id. at 7. This understanding is well developed in the case law. See e.g., Weit v.
Cont'l Ill. Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating parallel
pricing in industries characterized by fungible products and comparable cost structures is
not probative of conspiracy).
125. Indeed, oligopoly of some form is characteristic of "the vast majority of actual
markets." BORK, supra note 108, at 102.
126. See Weit, 641 F.2d at 463 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing and discussing Peveley Dairy Co.
v. U.S., 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), for the proposition that regulated input prices provide
an innocent rational explanation for parallel pricing behavior).
127. See Note, Conscious Parallelism: Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1951)
("Competition has been likened to a mutual confidence game, where each competitor is
trying to outguess the other fellow.") (citing M. A. Adelman, Effective Competition and the
Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1299 (1948)).
128. See Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV.
423, 428 (1997) (citing EDWARD CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION (1933)); BORK, The Antitrust Paradox, supra note 108, at 103 ("By such a
process the rivals may work themselves up to the monopoly price (and the restricted output
necessary to raise the price), jointly maximizing their profits, without ever once meeting
surreptitiously ....").
129. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993).
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irrational conduct. 30  Professor Whinston recently demonstrated the
difficulty that Turner recognized: "Can we tell [oligopolists] 'Do not
tacitly collude'? Or 'Do not make your pricing decisions with regard to
what your rivals do'?"'' The concern is heightened when we consider the
punitive nature of the Sherman One enforcement scheme. "[W]ould it be
fair to send managers to jail for failing to follow such vague
prescriptions?"' 32 The private treble-damages remedy is no better, because
of its punitive nature.
A second rationale for permitting tacit collusion, which is closely
related to the first, turns on the difficulty of distinguishing between
independent parallel activity and interdependent conduct. To an outside
observer, the two are indistinguishable. For one example, imitating
successful strategies of competitors is acting in parallel, but it is
competitive, not anti-competitive.'33  Far from being probably anti-
competitive, parallel conduct by competitors is most likely the result of
unilateral-and therefore legitimate-business decisions.'34
This wisdom underlay the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,'35 a case in many
ways very similar to Twombly. In an opinion written by Justice Tom Clark,
formerly the head of the Antitrust Division at the U.S. Department of
Justice, 36 the Court considered allegations that parallel refusal to permit
"first-run" movies to be shown outside of densely populated metropolitan
areas violated Sherman One. The defendants were a group of motion
picture producers and distributors, including Paramount Film Distributing,
Loew's, Inc., Twentieth-Century Fox, United Artists, Warner Brothers
Pictures, and Columbia Pictures. 1"' Plaintiff was an operator of a suburban
Baltimore theater, called the Crest, that was modem and well-appointed in
every way but its location.'38 All of the defendants rebuffed the plaintiffs
efforts to obtain first-run movies, arguing that exclusive franchises were
130. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 692 (1962).
131. Michael D. Whinston, Lectures in Antitrust Economics 39, 52 (2006).
132. Id. at 52-53.
133. Cert.-Stage Brief of William Baumol et al. in Support of Petitioners at 8-9, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, No. 05-1126 (U.S. 2007).
134. Epstein, supra note 11, at 3. See also supra note 123.
135. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
136. Justice Thomas C. Clark was the former head of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice. See TIMELINE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HIGHLIGHTS AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/timeline.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
137. Theatre Enterprises, 346 U.S. at 539, n.2.
138. Id. at 540 ("the Crest is a suburban theatre, located in a small shopping center, and
served by limited public transportation facilities; and, with a drawing area of less than one-
tenth that of a downtown theatre, it cannot compare with those easily accessible theatres in
the power to draw patrons.").
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necessary for their business, and plaintiffs inferior location made an
exclusive franchise with that theater unattractive. 39  Many of the
defendants shared the same rational, non-conspiratorial explanation for
their individual refusals to deal with the plaintiff in the market for first-run
pictures. 14  According to the Court, "The crucial question is whether
respondents' conduct toward petitioner stemmed from independent
decision or from an agreement, tacit or express .... [T]his Court has never
held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively establishes
agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a
Sherman Act offense.'
141
Procedurally, Theatre Enterprises is poor authority for the rule in
Twombly at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Court in Theatre Enterprises
reached the un-outstanding conclusion that a refusal to grant a directed
verdict for the plaintiff should be affirmed. 142 But the Court's substantive
rule on the definition of a Sherman One agreement provides substantial
support for the result in Twombly. Conscious parallel conduct by
competitors does not suffice to state a claim under Sherman One. Noted
antitrust commentators such as Professor Turner have accepted the rule.
"[C]onscious parallelism is never meaningful by itself .... [It is] a neutral
fact in the absence of evidence which would lead one to expect that price
would have been different if truly independent decisions had been
made."'4 3
Turner's proposition is by no means unchallenged among
commentators in the modern era. The other side of the argument-most
prominently advanced by Judge Posner-holds that consciously parallel
conduct, where competing gas stations on opposite street comers raise and
lower prices, seemingly in unison, sometimes several times a day, does
actually reflect a meeting of the minds of those competitors, and should be
treated as conspiratorial.' 44  Posner recognizes his approach is not the
"traditional legal approach," and instead defines collusive pricing as an
139. Id. at 540.
140. Id. at 540 ("the downtown theatres offer far greater opportunities for the widespread
advertisement and exploitation of newly released features, which is thought necessary to
maximize the overall return from subsequent runs as well as first-runs. The respondents, in
the light of these conditions, attacked the guaranteed offers of petitioner, one of which
occurred during the trial, as not being made in good faith. Respondents Loew's and Warner
refused petitioner an exclusive license because they owned the three downtown theatres
receiving their first-run product").
141. Id. at 540-41.
142. Id. at 541.
143. Turner, supra note 130, at 659.
144. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1575 (1969); POSNER,, supra note 1, at 94-96. Cf Mark D. Anderson,
Vertical Agreements Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Results in Search of Reasons, 37
U. Fla. L. Rev. 905, 934 (1985) (describing the Turner-Posner divide).
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economic construct. 45 As Posner states, "From an economic standpoint it
is a detail whether the collusive pricing scheme was organized and
implemented in such a way as to generate evidence of actual
communications."' 146 Professor Whinston points out, however, that there is
neither clear understanding of what exactly constitutes tacit collusion. For
example, is it tacitly collusive anytime prices in an oligopolistic industry
exceed marginal cost? 147  Recent game theoretic economic analysis,
detailed by economists including Werden and Carlton, has offered a more
nuanced understanding of consciously parallel pricing than the Turner-
Posner divide demonstrates. 48  However, from a doctrinal perspective,
what is essential is that the Theatre Enterprises rule has been solidly etched
into the body of Sherman One doctrine. 49 Barring federal legislation, the
doctrinal approach to conscious parallelism should remain unmolested.50
It is a dangerous game to indulge the inference of a conspiracy based
on facts, like parallel conduct, that more likely indicate legitimate unilateral
conduct. As Professor Epstein has argued, such an inference presents two
harms. One is the direct costs on the business of the particular defendants,
and the dead weight economic costs of litigation. The other is the
disincentives the inference would create for firms vigorously to compete,
because all "business decisions would be colored" by the danger of
Sherman One litigation.'5 ' Those are precisely the concerns underlying
Dura, Blue Chip Stamps and Associated General Contractors.
Firms faced with sanctions for acting in parallel would be acting
rationally if they deliberately avoided the most efficient course of
conduct-whether that be imitating competitors' winning strategies, or
pricing in parallel so as not to give a competitor an advantage. Judge Bork
145. POSNER, supra note 1, at 69.
146. Id. at 94.
147. Whinston, supra note 131, at 53-54 (answering in the negative. Whinston
distinguishes theoretically between "dynamic strategies" and "static Cournot competition,"
but recognizes even that distinction is difficult to appreciate in practice).
148. See Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion:
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 759-80 (2004);
Dennis W. Carlton, The Relevance for Antitrust Policy of Theoretical and Empirical
Advances in Industrial Organization, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47, 50 (2003); Carlton,
Gertner & Rosenfield, supra note 128, at 430-39; Willard K. Tom, Game Theory in the
Everyday Life of the Antitrust Practitioner, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 458-61 (1997)
(discussing authorities).
149. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007); Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). See also E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137-39 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing FTC
order based on consciously parallel conduct).
150. Cf Dillon, supra note 4, at 53 ("Theatre Enterprises killed conscious parallelism as
a legal doctrine; I hope you will make it your business to see that it stays buried.").
151. Epstein, supra note 11.
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argued that "[a] cluster of considerations require nonintervention in
doubtful cases." '152 And, in a related context, "adjustment to shifting costs
and demand is socially desirable, and it is best that appropriate responses
be made as quickly as possible."'53  A rule that penalizes firms (by
exposing them to litigation beyond the motion to dismiss stage) for
undertaking the rational response to stimuli, whether the actions of
competitors or external to the market, risks increasing price rigidity and
stifling other business decisions. That is all the more so where, as in the
case of the definition of agreement under Sherman One, the substantive
standards for liability remain vague. Whinston notes that under the Posner
definition of agreement, "[f]alse positives are a real danger" because it is
difficult even to define what qualifies, and to structure an effective remedy
for tacitly collusive conduct.'54
Those theoretical arguments are powerful. The expense of litigation
creates a powerful disincentive to engage in conduct that might bring it
about.'55 Where that conduct is harmful, that is a good result. Where that
conduct is beneficial, it is a grievous error.'56
The theoretical explanation for the Twombly rule runs up against a
criticism, however, which is that the danger of litigation apparently did not
prevent the Twombly defendants from acting rationally in pursuit of their
unilateral best interest in response to market stimuli. Where, then, is the
chilling effect? One response to the criticism is that we have no way of
knowing how many industries have been limited in their competitive vigor
by the threat of litigation, or indeed, in what circumstances the very
defendants in Twombly may have avoided pro-competitive conduct out of
fear of litigation.
Another response to the criticism is merely one of fairness. Onerous
litigation is a sanction in a very real sense, and sanctioning firms for what
we want them to do makes no sense.
152. BoRK, supra note 108, at 133.
153. Id. at 388 (discussing the Robinson Patman Act).
154. Whinston, supra, note 131, at 54.
155. This proposition is generally accepted. See, e.g., Whinston, supra note 131, at 54-
55 ("Firms will naturally avoid placing themselves in positions that trigger antitrust
intervention, whether monetary damages or restructuring, and this may lead them to shy
away from cost reductions or product improvements that might improve their margins.");
Cert.-Stage Brief, supra note 123, at 14-16 (discussing conduct by competitors that might
appear conspiratorial but is highly beneficial, competitive conduct). What is less well
understood, and perhaps impossible accurately to test, is the magnitude of the effect.
156. It is usually in the context of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005), that courts and commentators discuss the concern for "false positives"
preventing vigorous competition. See, e.g., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1986). These arguments thus have all the more force in
the context of Sherman Two litigation.
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Finally, Professor Fairman argued in 2003 that courts have required
fact-based pleading in conspiracy claims long before Twombly. "' If so, it
is the Second Circuit's rule that is the aberration, and the Twombly
defendants would have made their business decisions based on expectations
developed under the dominant approach courts took to pleading.'58
The challenge is to distinguish those claims that are inappropriate
sanctions for pro-competitive conduct-the false positives-from those
that appropriately act as disincentives to harmful conduct. Courts and
commentators understand that the height of competitive activity may look
very much like conduct that violates Sherman One. 5 9 The surest way is to
enforce rigorously the Dura requirement that a plaintiff plead the elements
of the substantive claim. In a nutshell, that is what Twombly now requires
for private suits alleging antitrust conspiracies.
B. Pleading Plus Factors
In 1984 in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Services Corp.,16° the Supreme
Court refused to infer an agreement from conduct that occurs "in the
normal course of business and do[es] not indicate illegal concerted
action.' 6 ' This is an application of the same rule that prohibits liability for
parallel conduct. Instead, and for the various reasons discussed previously
in this Article, "there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that the [defendants] were acting independently.' 62 The Court reiterated
that requirement two years later, in the opinion that served as a capstone to
the decades-old litigation in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp. 163 "[A] plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must
present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged
conspirators acted independently."' 64 That is a faithful rendering of Justice
Clark's Theatre Enterprises rule.
157. Fairman, supra note 50, at 1011-21 (arguing this is a legally erroneous approach).
158. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (discussing DM Research, Inc. v.
College of American Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999)).
159. See, e.g., Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 52 (3d Cir.
2007) (discussing competitive conduct that appears to violate the Sherman Act).
160. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
161. Id. at 763 (internal quotations omitted).
162. Id. at 764.
163. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
164. Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto). Matsushita tells a compelling tale about the
necessity to resolve claims early in litigation. Millions of dollars and dozens of years were
spent on litigation in that case, only to learn that the plaintiffs' theory of liability was
insufficient as a matter of law. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp,
475 U.S. at 576 (showing that the Matsushita lesson gives strong contextual support for the
result in Twombly).
2008]
652 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
Those rules are substantive rules of the law of conspiracies in
antitrust, not procedural requirements imposed because of some particular
feature of the antitrust claim. Such an account implies that the Twombly
opinion is not a civil procedure opinion at all, but is important only from
the perspective of the substantive antitrust law. That explains how Theatre
Enterprises could have compelled the result in Twombly, although the issue
arose at a very different stage of the litigation.
Procedurally, Dura commanded the conclusion-and Swierkiewicz did
not undermine it-that the Twombly plaintiffs were required to plead
allegations that satisfy the Matsushita and Theatre Enterprises rules. The
question is, then, what about the state of the market for local telephone and
Internet services makes parallel conduct in that market any more nefarious
than in the vast majority of circumstances?
Allegations of facts that are neutral, or ambiguous, do not meet the
standard. Commentators analyzing Matsushita agree that "proof of an
agreement requires some evidence that is exclusively of agreement."'
165
Courts and commentators have stated the required showing for
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy to be one of "parallel conduct
plus"-with the "plus" representing allegations that make it unlikely the
parallel conduct is based on a firm's pursuit of its unilateral 
best interest.166
Professor Epstein explained plus factors using the language of Monsanto.
"A plus factor is any form of evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that individuals work independently."'167  Whinston describes "evidence"
that "increas[es] the likelihood that a price-fixing conspiracy is taking, or
has taken, place."'161 Such plus-factor evidence is necessary when there is
no direct evidence of a conspiracy, but where enforcement policy demands
there be a way to prove a conspiracy with indirect evidence.
69
165. 2 BAUER & PAGE, supra note 38, § 11.4, at 59. Professors Bauer and Page
demonstrate this concept graphically with a Venn diagram comprised of overlapping circles.
If the leftmost circle represents evidence that indicates agreement, and the rightmost circle
represents evidence that indicates independent action, the overlap represents evidence that is
ambiguous as to whether it indicates agreement or independent action. "[E]vidence solely
in [the overlap] is insufficient." Id. § 11.5, at 59-60.
166. See Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 858-59 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing
plus factors); Werden, supra note 148, at 745 (locating the first use of the term "plus
factors" in the Ninth Circuit's 1952 decision in C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States,
197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952)).
167. Epstein, supra note 11, at 10-11 (citing Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
168. Whinston, supra note 131, at 39.
169. Id. at 38-39.
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Notably, although the doctrine was argued to the Court in Twombly
and has been discussed in the lower courts for decades, the Supreme Court
did not expressly adopt the doctrine of plus factors. 70
The idea of plus factors has long been understood by the Court.
Theatre Enterprises recognized that "business behavior is admissible
circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer agreement."''
In Twombly, the Court came close to explicitly adopting the construct,
twice quoting other sources (the Second Circuit's decision below and one
of the parties' briefs) as referencing "plus factors," and in the now-famous
footnote four defining additional circumstantial facts that might be
sufficient to vault allegations of parallel conduct into allegations of a
conspiracy."' It is fair to read the Twombly opinion as giving implicit
approval to an approach to implementing the Theatre Enterprises,
Matsushita and Monsanto rules that has been followed in the lower courts
for decades. With the deepening body of case law and scholarly
commentary defining plus factors, an appropriate vehicle for the Court to
consider them in greater depth may present itself in the near future.
It is good that the Court did not simply adopt wholesale the plus factor
doctrine from the courts of appeals. Much remains to be decided to
consider that framework sufficiently developed. Professor Whinston wrote
about the definition of a Sherman One agreement generally, arguing that it
is "paradoxical that the least controversial area of antitrust is perhaps the
one in which the basis of the policy in economic theory is weakest."' 73
That theoretical weakness invokes Judge Bork's concern for "fair warning"
to a regulated entity-impossible "if the 'law' depends on the sympathies
and prejudices of any one of the hundreds of federal judges before whom [a
businessman] may find himself arraigned."'' 7 4 Although Whinston did not
adopt the terminology of plus factors, he described them as being
represented by either structural evidence or behavioral evidence.'75
Evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of unilateral conduct is
not difficult to recognize at the margins. One example is the one plus
factor that the Twombly Court appeared to approve in footnote four:
170. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). See Interstate
Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 186-87 (3d ed.
1998). Special thanks to Roy Englert for this observation about Twombly.
171. 346 U.S. at 540. Compare Whinston, supra note 131, at 39 (noting that
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy is divided into structural and behavioral evidence).
172. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.4 (referencing "complex and historically
unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple
competitors, and made for no other discernible reason").
173. Whinston, supra note 131, at 26.
174. BORK, supra note 108, at 81.
175. Whinston, supra note 131, at 39-52.
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"complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made
at the very same time by multiple competitors, and made for no other
discernible reason."' 76 Of course, the challenge in the footnote four plus
factor is in the words, "for no other discernible reason." The difficult
question in Twombly is precisely whether "other discernible reasons" for
the ILECs parallel refusal to enter into competition as CLECs in one
another's territories undid the plaintiffs' allegations that the refusal was
irrational.
Plus factors have included a vague amalgam of matters, all of which
are relevant (in the way the Federal Rules of Evidence define the term) to
proof of conspiracy, but many of which fall far short of rising to the level
of "tending to exclude the possibility" of unilateral conduct. Some of the
facts pleaded in Twombly, including trade association involvement and
oligopolistic market structure, have been considered plus factors.'
77 But the
Court held they did not make it less likely that the defendants acted
unilaterally, or more likely they conspired.'
78
The answer, such as it is, is to require plaintiffs to plead facts that, if
true, give rise to a reasonable inference that the observed parallel conduct
was the product of a conspiracy. The implications of this answer are more
dramatic than they appear to be at first glance. The economic analysis of
oligopoly theory, the modern understanding of which can be traced to
Stigler's seminal 1964 article, "A Theory of Oligopoly,'
' 179 turns on
structural features of markets that make collusion more likely.
8 ° But
structural market features are neutral facts under a legal regime that
requires "some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a §
1 claim."'' Courts have refused to adopt wholesale the economic definition
of conspiracy, carving out from it the broad swath of conduct that is
176. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.4 (citing Brief for Respondents 37 and Reply Brief
for Petitioners 12).
177. See Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1987).
178. Cf Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1319-20 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding that eleven plus factors show "nothing more than [evidence] that the tobacco
industry is a classic oligopoly, replete with consciously parallel pricing behavior"); cf Weit
v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l. Bank & Trust, 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that plus
factors including opportunities to conspire and meetings among competitors are not
sufficient to survive summary judgment on claim of conspiracy).
179. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
180. See id. at 44-56 (discussing and modeling market structures conducive to collusion);
Andrew R. Dick, Identifying Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Restraint of
Trade, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 203, 208-11 (1996) (examining industry
characteristics that assist in forecasting cartel activity); POSNER, supra note 1 at 69-93
(listing factors that make collusion more likely and factors that provide circumstantial
evidence of collusion).
181. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966; c.f E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d
128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that an oligopolistic industry structure "represents a
condition, not a 'method"').
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consciously parallel rather than explicitly conspiratorial.' 82 Legal doctrine
thus narrows considerably, vis-d-vis economic theory, the sort of
allegations that will suffice to state a Sherman One claim.' 3
As noted above, at the margins, facts that rise to the level of being
plus factors are easy to define. The Twombly plaintiffs' quote from one
defendant's CEO was most consistent with that defendant's making a
unilateral business decision, but certainly a quote that was more concrete
and damning ("we met and decided on prices")-perhaps from a
disgruntled former employee-might be sufficient. Notably, Justice
Stevens in dissent in Twombly argued discovery was essential to determine
whether the CEO's quote was indeed neutral. 84  Allegations of trade
association involvement were neutral, but allegations of a secret meeting in
a smoke-filled room would be indicative of a conspiracy.'85 Allegations of
joint refusal to enter one another's markets were neutral, but the same
allegations of failure to enter, in a market in which the prevailing norm was
vigorous entry and exit, might be very different.'86 Allegations of parallel
price structures are neutral, but allegations of parallel and irrational price
structures might be sufficient.'87 This description of the shades of gray in
the plus factor framework demonstrates the impossibility of splitting hairs
with a chain saw.'88 The plus factor framework will always be difficult to
182. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 654-55 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting that "the statutory language" of Sherman One "is broad enough to
encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices," but that the legal doctrine requires proof
of an actual agreement, not just tacit coordination).
183. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 94 ("there is no distortion of accepted meanings in
viewing tacit collusion as a form of concerted rather than unilateral activity").
184. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1986-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (imagining that the
CEO might have confessed to a conspiracy and arguing the only way to find out would be to
depose him).
185. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 11. But see Dillon, supra note 4, at 25-26 (arguing
that as a practical matter, such evidence is unlikely to surface in most cases. "L 'espionnage
type of conspiracy, where men from competing companies meet at midnight in a smoke-
filled hotel room, wearing long black robes and black hats, and reduce their collusive
agreement to writing, is pass&.").
186. Cf. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972 (discussing the historical accident justification for
the Gerrymandered service areas, which otherwise might be evidence of conspiratorial
activity).
187. Id. at 1966 n.4 (citing both Respondent and Petitioner briefs which, in turn, suggest
that "complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very
same time by multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reason would support
a plausible inference of conspiracy.").
188. Cf E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)
(noting the "fine distinction" between "oligopolistic pricing alone," which is permissible,
and price changes by one player in a concentrated market serving as signals, picked up by
its competitor). For this reason it has been considered impossible to outlaw consciously
parallel pricing. See Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy for
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sum up in a simple legal rule.8 9 Antitrust law's unfortunate century-long
flirtation with per se rules shows that clarity may best be achieved through
the common law process.' 90
Interestingly, some of the facts that are proposed to be legitimate plus
factors would require economic analysis to establish.'
9' It is not
newsworthy to observe that economic analysis is a substantial aspect of a
private antitrust suit in the modem era. Economic analysis is regularly
employed on questions ranging from defining the relevant market to
establishing antitrust injury. "In antitrust litigation, the factual complexity
and economic nature of the issues involved require the presentation of
economic expert testimony in all but a few cases."'
92  In the case of
conspiracies under Sherman One, at least since Matsushita, economic
principles have been imbedded in the governing substantive rule of law.'
93
A possible implication of defining the pleading requirement based on
the substantive elements of the offense is that plaintiffs may be required, in
the absence of the ability to make direct allegations of conspiracy, to
produce an economic expert affidavit supporting their complaint.
9 4 Justice
'interdependent' pricing."). But see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct
Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REv. 9, 15, 32-49 (2004) (arguing that conduct
should be illegal if it is contrary to independent self interest); Alan Devlin, A Proposed
Solution to the Problem of Parallel Pricing in Oligopolistic Markets, 59 STAN. L. REv.
1111, 1143-50 (2007) (proposing a solution to the inability to legally sanction consciously
parallel pricing by means of methods involving "analogizing conscious parallelism in an
oligopoly with unilateral contract", prohibiting "parallel price increases arrived at through
barometric price leadership" and requiring "barriers to entry into the relevant market be
shown to exist").
189. See William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L. J.
405, 426-35 (2007) (proposing a definition of plus factors that turns on the type of
communication among competitors).
190. Cf Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-18
(2007) (where a practice can be both pro-competitive and anti-competitive, rule-of-reason
analysis on a case-by-case basis is better than per se condemnation).
191. The observation that doctrine rejects the pure economic definition of conspiracy
does not undermine this conclusion. Economic experts are able to apply their craft within
the relevant doctrinal framework. See Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of
Petitioners at 8-9, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126),
2006 WL 2506633; Page, supra note 189, at 429 (arguing "most economists believe that
[explicit communication] is usually necessary" to show agreement "in complex real-world
markets").
192. John Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise
in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 617 (2005).
193. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) (requiring an evaluation of the "competing inferences of independent action or
collusive action" from the facts alleged); id. at 592 (emphasizing the economic irrationality
of the story advanced by the plaintiffs).
194. Cf Epstein, supra note 11, at 12-13 (noting that true but vacuous factual allegations
at the motion to dismiss stage present starkly the economic question of what inference to
draw from those facts).
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Stevens, in his Twombly dissent, raised just that specter.' 95 That is a
dramatic result, but it is in reality the simple application of the Rule 8
standard in the context of a massively complex substantive legal scheme. 96
C. Recent Pleading Practice
Twombly has had an impact extending far beyond the substantive
Sherman One arena, evidenced by the number of citations the case has
enjoyed among the lower courts since the opinion came down in May 2007.
Within a year of its being handed down, Twombly has been cited by U.S.
tribunals more than 4800 times. 19 That number is more meaningful when
compared to the three other antitrust cases decided in the 2006 Term by the
Supreme Court-Weyerhaeuser, Credit Suisse v. Billing, and Leegin-all
of which might have been thought to be higher profile than Twombly when
certiorari was granted.1 98 Taken together, in approximately the same time
period, those cases have been cited 70 times by U.S. tribunals.' 99 A better
comparison that also paints a dramatic (if somewhat less so) picture, is to
the other pleading cases from the 2006 Supreme Court Term, Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.00 and Erickson v. Pardus.2 ' Tellabs has
informed the decisions of 186 tribunals since the opinion was issued, and
Erickson has been cited by 1189 courts.20 2 This loose bundle of statistics
tells at a minimum that Twombly is having an impact far beyond the scope
of the Sherman One claim, with which it ostensibly deals.
2 0 3
195. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1988 (arguing "the Federal Rules contemplate that
pretrial matters will be settled through a flexible process of give and take, of proffers,
stipulations, and stonewalls, not by having trial judges screen allegations for their
plausibility vel non without requiring an answer from the defendant").
196. Cf supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (arguing that Form 9 does a poor job
of demonstrating the manner of pleading claims more complex than simple negligence).
197. According to a Westlaw citation search run April 3, 2008. See also Dorf, supra,
note 20 (describing the impact of Twombly by a citation-count comparison at three months
from its issuance).
198. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007);
Credit Suisse USA LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007); Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
199. According to a Westlaw citation search run April 3, 2008.
200. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007)
201. 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
202. According to a Westlaw citation search run April 3, 2008.
203. See In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation, 502 F.3d 47, 50 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) ("A
narrow view of Twombly would have limited its holding to the antitrust context, or perhaps
only to Section 1 claims; but we have concluded that Twombly affects pleading standards
somewhat more broadly.") (citing authorities applying Twombly outside the Sherman One
and outside the antitrust arenas); Thomas, supra note 16, at 7 (predicting "far-ranging
ramifications to the impingement of the jury trial right in other types of cases"). Also,
Sherman One itself boasts only 309 cites by tribunals over the past year, according to a
Westlaw citation search run on April 3, 2008.
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The extent of its actual impact in the Sherman One arena is difficult to
evaluate. This Article notes above that the idea of true "notice" pleading in
the antitrust arena has something of an urban legend quality.
2 °4 Many pre-
Twombly influential decisions exist in which courts have required pleading
that would satisfy the Twombly standard. Judge Boudin's opinion in DM
Research, Inc. v. College of American Pathologists
25 is the leading pre-
Twombly authority on pleading a Sherman One conspiracy. The court
refused to sanction the fishing expedition that would entail from permitting
a conclusory allegation of "conspiracy" to entitle the plaintiff to discovery
to determine what facts demonstrated the conspiracy. "[T]he discovery
process is not available where, at the complaint stage, a plaintiff has
nothing more than unlikely speculations. While this may mean that a civil
plaintiff must do more detective work in advance, the reason is to protect
society from the costs of highly unpromising litigation.
2 °6
In Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,207 the Seventh Circuit
rejected as insufficient the allegation that "'defendants and their co-
conspirators entered into contracts and engaged in a continuing
combinations [sic] and conspiracies to restrain trade in the business of
providing haulaway motor transportation for new Ford automobiles.'
208
The Car Carriers court was swayed by "the costs of modem federal
antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts" in
holding that the allegation of a legal conclusion was insufficient.
2 9  In
addition, Judge Posner wrote in Sutliff, Inc. v. Donavan Cos.
210 that Conley
"has never been taken literally." 21' That approach comports with the
204. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
205. 170 F.3d 53,56 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding while this may mean that a civil plaintiff
must do more detective work in advance, the reason is to protect society from the costs of
highly unpromising litigation.").
206. Id. at 56.
207. 745 F.2d 1101 (7thCir. 1984).
208. Id. at 1104 (quoting the complaint).
209. Id. at 1106.
210. 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.).
211. Id. at 654. See also, e.g., Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006)
(arguing that conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support an antitrust conspiracy
claim); Univ. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding the allegations insufficient because plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of injury); In
re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981) (supporting the argument that
plaintiffs need particularized proof in order to establish damages); Larry R. George Sales
Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that the requirements of
pleading a claim under the Sherman Act can not be met by simple allegations); Heart
Disease Research Found. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissing
a claim where simple claims of conspiracy or injury were insufficient without supporting
facts); Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042, 1048
(D. Minn. 1992) (supporting the argument that allegations of conspiracy without particular
facts are inadequate to state a claim); Fort Wayne Telsat v. Entm't & Sports Programming
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Supreme Court's own recognition in Associated General Contractors,
where allegations by a union of conduct by employers to undermine the
union were rejected, that "in a[n] [antitrust] case of this magnitude, a
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed."
' 12
The recent conclusion of the Second Circuit in In re Elevator Antitrust
Litigation213 that, after Twombly, allegations of parallel conduct coupled
with conclusory allegations of a conspiracy-allegations nearly
indistinguishable from those the same court had held sufficient in
Twombly-is not path breaking in light of the depth of pre-Twombly
precedent on conspiracy claims generally and Sherman One claims
specifically. 214 It is true, however, that the Second Circuit's approach to
pleading Sherman One in Elevators is diametrically opposed to that court's
approach prior to reversal in Twombly.
215
The Ninth Circuit has reached post-Twombly a result not inconsistent
with the pre-Twombly DM Research precedent. In Kendall v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., allegations that the defendants agreed, unaccompanied by allegations
giving rise to an inference of an agreement, were insufficient to state a
claim.
2 16
In In re Late Fee and Over-Limit Fee Litigation in the Northern
District of California,217 allegations of "lockstep pricing" of late fees,
together with allegations of opportunity and incentive to, collude and
conclusory allegations of agreement, were insufficient to meet the Sherman
One standard post-Twombly.218  The court also noted features of the
complaint, including the conclusory nature of the conspiracy allegations
and the pleading of facts, which themselves provided innocent explanations
for the parallel conduct alleged, that should have encouraged dismissal
under such cases as Sutliff or DM Research. In In re Graphics Processing
Units Antitrust Litigation, the Northern District of California held that
allegations of parallel pricing and parallel product releases were
Network, 753 F. Supp. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Heart Disease for the proposition
that conclusory statements without facts permit dismissal of antitrust claim).
212. 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983). Justice Stevens, the dissenter in Twombly, wrote the
opinion in Associated General Contractors.
213. 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007).
214. See id. at 50-52 (rejecting the allegations as insufficient).
215. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
original opinion in Twombly).
216. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-16549, slip op. 2191-2194 (9th Cir. Mar.
7, 2008).
217. 2007 WL 4106353 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007).
218. Id. at *5.
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insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss post-Twombly.
21 9  Those
holdings would not be surprising even in the pre-Twombly world.
But Twombly does not spell the end of Sherman One litigation.
2 0 This
Article discusses above the sorts of plus factors that should be sufficient to
permit a claim to proceed.22 1 Plaintiffs in Pennsylvania and California have
been able to clear the hurdle. In In re OSB Antitrust Litigation, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that allegations of secret meetings and a
published price list were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
222
Likewise, in In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, allegations of
parallel pricing, together with allegations of meetings, including who was
present and how they were involved in fixing prices, were sufficient.
223
IV. CONCLUSION
Potential criticisms of the approach to pleading the Sherman One
claim discussed in this Article abound. The application of Rule 8,
according to its terms, to the substantive antitrust rules has the effect of
making more difficult the task for private plaintiffs in entering the litigation
arena. That is more so because antitrust conspiracy claims, at least, involve
conduct that is secretive in nature. The defendants are also the gatekeepers
of the kind of information necessary to satisfy the pleading requirement.
Those two factors produce dramatic information asymmetries. Justice
Stevens discussed in his dissent (in a portion which Justice Ginsburg did
not join) that the result is to protect "antitrust defendants-who in this case
are some of the wealthiest corporations in our economy-from the burdens
of pretrial discovery., 22 4 Those concerns ignore fundamentals about the
legal and regulatory scheme.
Telecom regulation and antitrust have had an uneasy relationship since
1996. When the Telecom Act was passed, it was predictable that the
requirements of interconnectivity would present exclusionary conduct
concerns, as competitors sought to enter new markets and incumbents
219. 2007 WL 2875686, at *10-*11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007) (noting that Plaintiffs
allegations could lead to a conclusion of coincidence rather than conspiracy).
220. But cf Thomas, supra note 16 (draft at 7-8) (arguing that after the trilogy of
summary judgment decisions in 1986, which included the Matsushita decision, "the courts
exponentially increased their use of summary judgment," particularly in antitrust cases, and
that the same should be expected for the motion to dismiss after Twombly).
221. See supra notes 165-198 and accompanying text (discussing pleading plus factors).
222. 2007 WL 2253419, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007) ("Plaintiffs in the instant case
have alleged facts that strongly suggest-and are 'not merely consistent with'-a price-
fixing conspiracy.").
223. 504 F. Supp. 2d 777, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Plaintiffs' allegations against Welch
are specific and substantial enough to state a cognizable claim.").
224. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1989 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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sought to keep them out. So they did, and in Verizon Communications Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,n5 the Supreme Court held there was no
place for a Sherman Two suit in the regulatory scheme.1 6  One might
wonder whether the same rule could be applied to the Sherman One claim
raised in Twombly. The Supreme Court noted that some of plaintiffs'
allegations supporting their conspiracy claims were the result of the
changing regulatory scheme. That being so, perhaps, like Sherman Two,
the Sherman One claims should be approached with particular
circumspection in that particular industry.
What is clear about antitrust claims in general, and their application in
this industry specifically, is that the substantive law imposes a heavy
burden on plaintiffs. It does so to protect against the direct harm to
individual defendants and the broader economic consequences of punishing
commercial activity. Unlike the civil rights claims at issue in the Supreme
Court's other recent pleading cases, where individual dignity of the
plaintiffs is implicated, private suits under the antitrust laws primarily serve
the purpose of vindicating broader economic interests. The remedy
available serves as an incentive-perhaps a poorly designed one 2-to
encourage private plaintiffs to incur the expense. But it is the public right
at stake, not the individual remedy, that is the primary thrust of the cause of
action. Thus, imposing strict standards for private claims as a matter of
substantive antitrust law-with the effect of making it harder to survive the
procedural hurdle of a motion to dismiss 2 S-is a necessary protection
against misaligned incentives. That check would be undermined by a
contrary rule that allowed claims to proceed despite the failure to plead
elements. The Twombly Court struck a substantially correct balance.
225. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
226. See id. at 412-16 ("The 1996 Act is, in an important respect, much more ambitious
than the antitrust laws. It attempts 'to eliminate the monopolies enjoyed by the inheritors of
AT&T's local franchises.' Section 2 of the Sherman Act, by contrast, seeks merely to
prevent unlawful monopolization. It would be a serious mistake to conflate the two goals.").
227. See Huffman, supra note 2, at 114 ("little incentive exists for private plaintiffs to
limit their claims, so the remedy does not result in too great of deterrence by the
defendant.").
228. Cf Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
"an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) that seems to be driven by the
majority's appraisal of the plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation").
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